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Abstract1 
 
Although much discussed, there is in fact very little common EU foreign policy. The 
main reason for this is the reluctance, even the resistance of the member states to 
grant more authority to the Union in this field. This is unfortunate because the 
European Union could make a distinctive and positive contribution to the 
development of peaceful conflict resolution and a rule-based international order. 
This paper looks at three questions: the reasons for the lack of a common European 
foreign and security policy, what institutions might make a critical difference in 
developing more commonness and what the specific characteristics of a ‘post-
modern’ EU foreign policy might be. 
 
                                                           
1   This paper will appear as a chapter in the forthcoming book by Maciej Wilga and 
Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski (eds.), New Approaches to EU Foreign Policy, 2012. 
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Introduction 
 
The key questions that the notion of a common European foreign and security policy 
faces are not whether adequate institutions and the right personnel are available. 
Although important, those are secondary questions. The main issues are: first, whether 
and how a common foreign policy can indeed be brought about, and second, 
w h a t  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  s u c h  a  c o m m o n  f o r e i g n policy might be. This paper explores 
these issues and looks into why the European Union might be particularly suited and 
able to pursue objectives that are frequently subsumed under the concept of a 
‘post-modern diplomacy’. The term ‘diplomacy’ broadly refers to everything an 
actor does on the international stage. However, what is meant here is not the 
technique of modern diplomacy – although much has changed there, too – but 
rather its content, that is the foreign policy of an actor, in this case the European 
Union.  
 
For the purposes of this paper, post-modern foreign policy will be understood as 
encompassing two major components: first, collective and other-regarding interests 
as essential elements of policy next to self-regarding interests, and second, the 
objective of effectively promoting the development of international relations 
towards a rule-based order grounded on the recognition of common interests and 
peaceful conflict resolution. Such a foreign policy and concomitant diplomacy 
would not only synergise political objectives with economic, security, development 
and cultural policies but it would require the EU to mainstream collective and other-
regarding interests in its foreign policy. The purpose would be to enhance peaceful 
interaction and overall stability, in the long-term and world-wide. The question is 
whether the European Union could indeed make a difference: through its own 
model of peaceful conflict resolution in the collective interest as well as by a foreign 
policy that successfully promotes a new type of ‘international governance’. 
 
The development of such a foreign policy will necessarily consist of two inter-related 
steps: arriving at a common policy and determining its nature. This paper thus looks 
at the reasons why it has been and is so difficult to arrive at a common foreign policy 
as well as what institutions might play a primary role in promoting more commonness 
before going into what the nature of a European post-modern foreign policy might 
entail. 
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Why is there no common foreign policy? 
 
After the agreement on the set-up of the new European External Action Service 
(EEAS) had come about on 8 July 2010,2 the two key actors on this issue in the 
European Parliament (EP), the German Christian Democrat Elmar Brok and the 
Belgian Liberal Guy Verhofstadt, emphasised that only a structure had been 
created, not yet a common foreign policy: “[W]e can only supply the structure. Now 
it is up to all of us, to Lady Ashton, the Council, the Member States, the Commission 
and the EP, to develop a coherent policy and to bundle our competences and 
expertise.”3 
 
Structures are important for procedures; they can ease or constrain them. But they 
provide no guarantee that a common policy will in fact be achieved and 
implemented. The will to attain it is prerequisite. 
 
Unfortunately, the outlook is hardly encouraging. Throughout the establishment of 
the European External Action Service in 2010 it was apparent that except for the 
European Parliament the project of a common foreign policy had no lobby. The 
Commission was concerned that it might have to sacrifice competences or 
prerogatives in the field of external relations,4 and the Council was intent on 
maintaining its institutional set-up by first creating a new Crisis Management and 
Planning Directorate and then transferring it en bloc to the External Service.5  
                                                           
2    On this day the European Parliament adopted by overwhelming majority (549 in 
favour, 78 against, 17 abstentions) the Report presented by Elmar Brok; see European 
Parliament, "European External Action Service", European Parliament legislative resolution of 8 
July 2010 on the proposal for a Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning 
of the European External Action Service (08029/2010 – C7-0090/2010 – 2010/0816(NLE)), 
P7_TA(2010)0280, 8 July 2010. Subsequently, the Council took a formal decision on 26 July 
2010 establishing the EEAS, see Council of the European Union, "Council Decision of 26 July 
2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service 
(2010/427/EU)", Official Journal of the European Union, L201, 3.8.2010, pp. 30-40.  
3   Elmar Brok, From Global Payer to Global Player, Interview by Stefani Weiss, Spotlight 
Europe Special, July 2010, Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Foundation, p. 5. Guy Verhofstadt added: 
“We now have a good political instrument, but we need as well the political will to use it.” 
Ibid. 
4    In fact, one of the first steps of President Barroso was to move the important 
competence for the European Neighbourhood Policy “from the Commissioner for External 
Relations, where it had been located in the previous Commission, to the Commissioner for 
Enlargement”, thus ensuring that it would not fall under the competence of the new High 
Representative; see Stefani Weiss, External Action Service. Much Ado about Nothing, 
Spotlight Europe, June 2010, Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Foundation, p. 3. 
5   On the bickering between the various actors see the analysis by Weiss, ibid. 
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The key actors, however, were the member states. It became entirely clear that they 
wanted neither an institution nor a procedure nor a person that would be in a 
position to force them or even to be able to pressure them in the direction of a 
common foreign policy. They did not want to sacrifice their room for manoeuvre in 
an area that they consider vital, even if the room for manoeuvre is not that big 
anymore. But events on the international stage and the development of the 
international order are uncertain, and hence national governments prefer to keep a 
free hand to pursue a policy which they feel is best suited to the specific national 
interest in any specific situation. Of course, this may also occur within the European 
framework, but does not have to. The European Union with its Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) is only one option among several.6 
 
Moreover, a common European foreign policy – ‘together we are strong’ – just does 
not appear to be urgent. There may be many arguments why it is in fact exigent or 
would at least be advantageous, but most EU governments simply do not look at it 
that way. To most, there is no pressing external threat or challenge (or benefit!) that 
would be sufficient to bring the Europeans together. There are regular calls that a 
common energy policy, joint efforts on climate or a common policy for the Middle 
East would be desirable or even imperative, but that is about as far as it goes. The 
fact is that there is neither a sense of need nor sufficient external pressure to bring the 
Europeans together. 
 
In other words, the common foreign and security policy, where- and whenever it 
does come about, is primarily (as one perceptive observer has noted) a 
‘convenient’ policy. It is a policy that comes about when all can agree because the 
various national interests are either viewed in similar fashion, there are in fact no 
strong interests involved or the policy arrived at is based on the lowest common 
denominator. 
 
It is thus entirely logical that the High Representative and Vice President of the 
Commission (HR/VP), Lady Catherine Ashton, sees her key task in working on the 
member states behind the scenes to persuade them to follow a common approach, 
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possibly parallel but at least not contradictory courses of action. This was no different 
when Javier Solana was the High Representative. It is, without doubt, one of the main 
tasks of the High Representative. But if there is no marked policy outcome, acting 
only behind the scenes necessarily means that the EU foreign policy representative is 
not out front on the stage. If it is an objective that the EU should have a stronger 
voice and carry more weight on the international stage, then the High 
Representative thus far has fallen short of the target (and under the circumstances is 
not alone to blame for this). 
 
Of course, there has been progress, particularly when the period for comparison is 
set far enough into the past. But the question is whether such progress should be 
measured by comparing it to the situation twenty years ago or by the necessities of 
today and the needs of tomorrow. Thus, the EU is setting up a European foreign 
service which, however, is not to be called a foreign service. The High Representative 
is not to be named foreign minister and the Union delegations may not be labelled 
embassies.7 One may want to call this mere symbolism rather than substance. But 
symbols symbolise what is wanted. They indicate an objective, and here they 
indicate that at least a significant number of member states do not want institutions 
or procedures that will ensure a common European foreign policy that is more than 
ad hoc and comes about only when it happens to be convenient. In this sense, too, 
deleting the flag and the hymn from the Constitutional Treaty was no trifle. It showed 
that the objectors do not want a European Union based on a common identity and 
the common loyalty of its citizens. A ‘convenient’ Europe seems to suffice. 
 
But is that sustainable? Is it possible to build a strong Europe, capable of defending its 
interests in the international arena, on such uncertain ground? What has already 
become apparent in the economic sphere is also valid for foreign policy. A 
significantly larger degree of political unity with binding majority decisions is 
prerequisite to meeting up-coming challenges. 
 
                                                           
6      Among many, two glaring examples illustrate the point: the disagreement on the 
recognition of Kosovo and the disagreement on reactions to events in Libya in the early 
months of 2011. 
7   Some of the smaller member states that do not have embassies in all areas of the 
world, had hoped that the Union delegations might perform some functions, e.g. consular 
tasks, but this was rejected. 
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Is a common foreign policy possible? 
 
Despite progress and despite instances of a common EU foreign policy, one can 
hardly make a good case arguing that the Europeans are on a clear path towards 
achieving such a policy, let alone having come near the target. There are multiple 
examples that could be cited where the lack of a common European stance was as 
glaring as the potential advantages had there been one. The fundamental divisions 
over the American intervention in Iraq were close to devastating, the fact that not all 
of the member states see themselves in a position to recognise Kosovo is 
embarrassing, and the uneven reactions to the events in the Arab countries at the 
beginning of 2011 are revealing. 
 
Finances and foreign policy are two pillars of traditional state sovereignty. In both 
areas the member states of the Union are reluctant or simply resistant to giving up 
powers to Brussels. There are two reasons why progress seems to come more readily – 
although not easily – in the economic sphere. The first is that the only country that 
stood to loose something by the introduction of monetary union in 1999 was 
Germany, the continent’s largest economy – and Germany was willing to submit 
itself: because this was apparently the price to be paid for French acquiescence to 
German re-unification,8 because the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was 
convinced that the common currency would ensure the ‘point of no return’ for the 
process of European integration and – most importantly – because the large majority 
of Germans were at this time still strongly committed to the idea of European unity.9 
The second reason for the more ready progress in the economic sphere is that in the 
early phases the expected economic benefits, but since then the growing economic 
challenges, are determinants that have rapid, immediate and usually attributable 
consequences for the individual citizen. 
 
These reasons give a good indication of why there is so much less movement in the 
foreign policy realm. All countries feel that they would have something to lose, there 
is no dominant actor who might set an example, the needs do not appear as 
                                                           
8   This point is controversial, but there have been several indications that some sort of a 
‘deal’ was struck. France, after all, was highly interested in wresting the power of the 
Deutschmark from Germany. 
9   This may be changing with German citizens becoming increasingly sceptical. See, for 
example, Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, “Wieder mal auf Sonderfahrt? Deutschland kommt der 
europapolitische Enthusiasmus abhanden“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23.5.2011, p. 10. 
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pressing and the potential benefits are not as obvious (and may not come about at 
all, since even with a common foreign policy the results would depend on the policy 
itself). 
 
There is no way around it: a common foreign and security policy in Europe by way of 
better institutions or more elaborate procedures has not come about. More than two 
decades since the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam provide ample evidence for 
this. A common foreign policy will only happen based on what politicians and 
academics like to call somewhat vaguely ‘political will’. But ‘will’ implies resolve. That 
is, the member states must want a common foreign policy. Short of an outside threat 
such will or resolve can only be based on more political unity. Political unity in the 
European Union must rest on the following requirements: the development of a truly 
European civil society with the concomitant trans-group trust, the growth of a 
common, trans-national loyalty to the Union10 and awareness that the problems of 
one are the problems of all.11  
 
It is this latter point that seems to be a decisive hurdle. Can we expect the 
government of Spain to be as concerned about Russia as the governments of the 
Baltic Republics are? And can we expect the latter to be as concerned about 
migration from Africa as Spain is? Is it conceivable to arrive at something like the 
United States where illegal migration from Mexico to Texas is considered not (only) a 
Texan, but (also) an American issue, although the citizens of Maine or North Dakota 
are not immediately affected? 
 
Up to this day this has not been achieved in Europe. That is the prime reason why the 
call for solidarity in the debt crisis of Greece, Ireland and Portugal met with such a 
mixed reaction in the European public (outside of the concerned countries, of 
course). It was particularly understandable in the case of Germany for two major 
reasons. First of all, in all such cases Germany has to bear by far the largest share of 
the financial burden. Secondly, it was Germany that throughout the decades, from 
Maastricht to Lisbon, had consistently been calling for more political unity – and was 
                                                           
10   As the former Bavarian Prime Minister Franz-Joseph Strauß is quoted as having said: It 
must be possible to be a good Bavarian, a good German and a good European at the same 
time. 
11   Admittedly, the comparison is a bit skewed, but it is ironic that these are the very aims, 
specifically civil society and trans-group trust, that form key objectives of EU policies towards 
precarious states and developing democracies. 
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equally consistently disappointed. Perhaps this will once more be recorded as a story 
of ‘missed opportunities’. Whatever the case may be, the fact is that there is no 
common European identity solid enough to form the foundation of common 
European policies in critical areas or critical times.  
 
Even if persistently ignored, the issue will not simply disappear. The question of 
political unity – the much avoided finalité politique – is on the table. Ignoring it is a 
decision with consequences. It means that the EU will continue to move down the 
slippery path – on which it already is – towards becoming something like a large 
customs union with a few supranational components and a limited amount of soft 
influence beyond its borders (and an uncertain future). It will go into the history books 
as an ambitious experiment with many good results but well short of its objectives. 
 
Can this course be changed? Currently, there is not much to give hope. But there 
are two institutions that might make a difference: the European Parliament and the 
High Representative/Vice President together with the External Action Service. 
 
The critical role of the European Parliament 
 
The European Parliament is the hub of European integrationist thinking. Apart from 
the small group of Euro-sceptics, the vast majority of its members favour further and 
deeper integration. Parliament can use all of its instruments to call for a more 
coherent and unified European voice in foreign affairs. It can follow the conduct of 
EU foreign policy closely and on a day-by-day basis. Parliament and its committees 
can question the HR/VP and EEAS officials on any foreign policy issue,12 can query 
why coherence and consistency of policies are lacking, and it can exert influence 
on member states that are dragging their feet. 
 
From the very beginning of its founding and increasingly since the first direct 
elections in 1979, the European Parliament has worked towards extending its powers. 
In its own understanding it represents the European people, thus the sovereign, and 
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hence has the right and the obligation to oversee and guard the direction and 
development of the Union. 
 
In the area of foreign and security policy, the extension of its competence and 
powers went step by step, from treaty to treaty. The current status is determined by 
the Lisbon Treaty that went into effect on 1 December 2009.13 In addition to its 
increased powers in the traditional areas of competence,14 including all those areas 
of ‘external relations’ that fall within the competence of the Commission, the 
European Parliament sought to gain more influence also in the field of foreign policy. 
 
The biggest prize was, of course, the newly to be established European External 
Action Service.15 The initial and most far-reaching objective of Parliament was the 
integration of the Service into the Commission. Not only does the EP have full 
parliamentary control over the Commission, but integrating the EEAS into the 
Commission structure would have included the foreign and security policy 
components of the Council, thus ‘supranationalising’ these components and 
actually extending the EP’s competence over areas previously under the exclusive 
control of the member states.  
 
Not entirely surprisingly, this objective was not achieved. Instead, the EEAS was set up 
as “a functionally autonomous body of the European Union, separate from the 
General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission with the legal capacity 
                                                           
12    The Lisbon Treaty does not say anything about the right of the EP to request EU 
diplomats to appear before Parliamentary committees, but in the Council Decision 
establishing the EEAS, it was agreed that the HR/VP would “facilitate” such appearances. See 
Council of the European Union, "Adoption of a Council Decision establishing the organisation 
and functioning of the European External Action Service (2010/C 210/01), Draft Declaration 
by the High Representative on political accountability", Official Journal of the European 
Union, C210, 3.8.2010, pp. 1-2. 
13    Council of the European Union, "Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union", Official Journal of the 
European Union, C 83, 30.3.2010, pp. 1-388. 
14   The Lisbon Treaty has granted the European Parliament significant new law-making 
and budgetary powers. Some 40 new fields (including trade, energy, immigration, justice and 
home affairs, health and structural funds) are now subject to the co-decision procedure 
between Parliament and Council. Parliament now decides on the entire budget (the 
previous distinction between ‘compulsory’ and ‘non-compulsory expenditure’ having been 
discarded). 
15   See specifically the Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the European External Action Service (2010/427/EU), op.cit. 
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necessary to perform its tasks and attain its objectives”.16 Competences and 
administrative units were transferred from both Council Secretariat and Commission.  
 
However, making use of its budgetary17 and staff regulation competences,18 the 
European Parliament succeeded in a number of critical points. Most importantly, it 
achieved full budgetary control over the External Action Service,19 including over 
personnel seconded from member states.20 It was also conceded that recruitment 
“should be based on merit whilst ensuring adequate geographical and gender 
balance”.21 To ensure the ‘community character’ of the EEAS, it was agreed that 
“permanent officials of the Union should represent at least 60% of all EEAS staff at the 
AD level”.22 
 
While Parliament did not succeed in achieving something like co-decision with the 
High Representative on the appointment of personnel for the top positions in the EU 
Delegations, it was conceded that it could invite appointees for a discussion (rather 
than a formal hearing, a custom in any case not prevalent in European foreign 
services): 
 
The HR will respond positively to requests from the European Parliament for 
newly appointed Heads of Delegations to countries and organisations which 
the Parliament considers as strategically important to appear before the AFET 
for an exchange of views (differing from hearings) before taking up their posts. 
The same will apply to the EUSRs.23 
 
It is also foreseen that the HR/VP “will facilitate the appearance of Heads of 
delegations, EUSRs, Heads of CSDP missions and senior EEAS officials in relevant 
parliamentary committees and sub-committees in order to provide regular 
briefings.”24 
                                                           
16   Ibid., Art. 1 (2) 
17   Art. 14 (1) TEU, op.cit.  
18   Regulation No. 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and 
the Conditions of Employment of other Servants of the European Economic Community and 
the European Atomic Energy Community (O) 45, 14.6.1962. 
19   See Council Decision 2010/427 of 26 July 2010, (14), op.cit. 
20    This was of some concern to the Parliament, but it succeeded in ensuring that 
seconded personnel will be held fully responsible to the EP in terms of the budget. 
21   Council Decision 2010/427 of 26 July 2010, (10), op.cit. 
22   Ibid., Art. 6 (9). 
23   Council Decision, 2010/C 210/01, (5), op.cit. 
24   Ibid., (7). 
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The European Parliament has to consent to international treaties that the Union 
signs25 and it was reasserted that it is to be regularly consulted and its views “duly 
taken into consideration”.26 On CFSP, the HR/VP “will seek the views of the European 
Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of this policy in conformity with 
Article 36 TEU.”27 Arrangements were also to be made for “access for Members of 
the European Parliament to classified documents and information of the CFSP”.28  
                                                          
 
In addition to its budgetary and legislative functions, Art. 14(1) of the Lisbon Treaty 
establishes that the European Parliament “shall exercise functions of political control 
and consultation”, and this is where it may ultimately have the most far-reaching 
influence. Parliament’s role in this respect in emphasised:  
 
In her relationship with the European Parliament, the High Representative (HR) 
will build on the consultation, information and reporting engagements 
undertaken during the last legislature […] Where necessary, these 
engagements will be adjusted in light of Parliament’s role of political control.29 
 
Taken together, the European Parliament has gained in status in the area of foreign 
policy. Its influence on the High Representative, who as a member of the Commission 
is at least partly and, of course, wholly dependent on Parliament for the EEAS 
budget, could extend significantly. The EP can develop into the vanguard in 
portraying the European role in the world, in developing awareness of this role 
amongst all European citizens and in pushing the Union and its representatives into 
actively developing and representing those policies that support and further 
European interests. If Parliament commits itself and if it uses the powers that it has, it 
can make a difference. 
 
Can the High Representative and the EEAS do more? 
 
While the role of the European Parliament lies in strengthening awareness of foreign 
policy issues, overall European interests and European identity in facing the 
 
25    “The European Parliament will be, in accordance with Article 218 (10) TFEU, 
immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure, including agreements 
concluded in the area of CFSP.” Council Decision 2010/C 210/01 (2), op.cit. 
26   Council Decision 2010/427 of 26 July 2010, (6) op.cit. 
27   Council Decision, 2010/C 210/01, op.cit. 
28   Council Decision 2010/427 of 26 July 2010, (6) op.cit. 
29   Council Decision, 2010/C 210/01, op.cit. 
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challenges, the European External Action Service will have a more immediate task of 
implementing European foreign policy in meeting day-to-day requirements. 
 
The EEAS, formally launched on 1 December 2010 and with more than 1600 civil 
servants in the initial phase, is the diplomatic service of the European Union.30 
Whereas in the past the Commission delegations concentrated primarily on trade 
and development and particularly on project management,31 they are expected to 
take on more political tasks in the future.32 T h i s  w i l l  m e a n ,  o n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  
representing the EU and informing about it, both in the wide sense of public 
diplomacy, i.e. winning sympathy, and in the sense of information in order to 
establish closer relationships in areas such as economic or educational 
cooperation.33 Seeking to influence both relevant elites and the public in general is 
part of this function. 
 
On the other hand, the EEAS diplomats, stationed in third countries, will be expected 
to report to Brussels on the on-going relationship, on opportunities that may arise for 
the EU (in trade or in any other area) and on political developments. It is the political 
function that is new, not primarily in terms of reporting to Brussels – to a limited extent 
this has taken place in the past34 – but in terms of having a new ‘receiver’ or 
addressee in Brussels: the EEAS and the High Representative tasked with the 
development and implementation of EU foreign and security policy.  
 
The key challenges for the External Action Service and the High Representative are: 
 
                                                           
30   For a closer analysis see Dieter Mahncke and Sieglinde Gstöhl (eds.), European Union 
Diplomacy: Changes and Challenges under the Treaty of Lisbon, College of Europe Studies, 
Brussels, PIE Peter Lang, forthcoming. 
31   For a short history see European Commission, Taking Europe to the World – 50 Years of 
the European Commission External Service, Luxembourg: 2004, as well as the Washington 
Delegation History at http://www.eurunion.org/delegati/DCDelHistory.htm (retrieved June 
2011). 
32   See Mahncke/Gstöhl, European Union Diplomacy, op.cit. 
33   On the changes with regard to modern diplomacy see ibid., ch. 1. 
34    However, the rather astonishing fact must be noted that the developments in the 
Arab states of North Africa in early 2011 apparently caught the EU by surprise! After all, the EU 
did have Commission delegations in these countries and with its projects generally being 
close to the ‘grass roots’ one would have expected ‘early warning’. It is not clear whether this 
did not occur because there were no reports or because there was no ‘receiver’ in Brussels, 
whether the ‘receivers’ did not respond or whether the reports got lost in the bureaucratic 
maze. 
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•  to set up a capable and efficient Service with highly qualified personnel,35 
•  to provide the Service with clear and precise guidelines on what the targets 
and tasks are, 
•  to use the resources of the Service to develop foreign and security policy 
concepts and alternatives. 
 
Primarily the latter task – the development of policy concepts and alternatives – 
should provide the High Representative with a basis for more wide-ranging activities. 
In particular, this should provide an adequate foundation for the HR/VP to be able to 
take the initiative in the discussions with the member states as well as in public 
statements. The Lisbon Treaty gives the High Representative the right to submit 
initiatives or proposals.36 In other words, the HR/VP must be more than a ‘receiver of 
orders’ from the member states and the ‘implementer’ of such orders. There is 
nothing in the Treaty that bars the High Representative from being active and 
outgoing in the presentation and promotion of own initiatives and proposals. This is 
where new opportunities lie. Who else, if not the High Representative, with the 
support of a large bureaucracy, can move the Union towards a common policy and 
a single voice? The President of the European Council can go in the same direction, 
but lacks the extensive support base which the HR/VP has. Ideally, of course, the two 
would move together.  
 
A new foreign policy  
 
When considering the idea of a common European foreign and security policy, the 
issues most frequently discussed are what institutional arrangements might ease the 
making of such a policy and how coherence between the institutions, the different 
policies and between the member states and the EU might best be ensured. Much 
less attention is paid to the question of what type of foreign policy this might be. 
 
In view of the difficulties of even coming close to something that deserves to be 
called a common European foreign and security policy, this is understandable. In 
frustration or at least in endeavouring to gloss over the shortcomings, a – not entirely 
convincing – attempt was made to differentiate between a ‘common’ and a 
                                                           
35   On the training of EEAS personnel see Mahncke/Gstöhl, European Union Diplomacy, 
op.cit., concluding chapter. 
36   Art. 30 TEU, op.cit. 
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‘single’ foreign policy.37 A common foreign policy, it is assumed, would be a policy 
which sets aims and all member states act, in their individual foreign policies, in 
accordance with these aims. A single foreign policy would apparently mean 
something more, namely that there would be an approved single definition as well 
as agreement on the means and the concrete implementation of the policy. But as 
long as the EU is not something much closer to political union with a single foreign 
ministry – not something to be expected soon – the only realistic concept is a 
‘common’ policy in the sense of common and agreed objectives. Member states’ 
foreign policies would move independently but in a coordinated manner to avoid 
contradictions, secure division of labour and ensure both coherence and 
consistency. This is exactly what has been attempted since the Treaty of Amsterdam 
and the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Treaty of Lisbon is 
no more than an effort to further improve institutional and procedural arrangements: 
 
Within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action, the 
Union shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security 
policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among 
Member States, the identification of questions of general interest and the 
achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member 
States’ actions.38 
 
Member states are repeatedly called upon (implored?) to adhere to the common 
policy of the Union, to exercise political solidarity and not to act against the interests 
of the Union: 
 
The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy 
actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall 
comply with the Union’s action in this area. 
The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual 
political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the 
interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in 
international relations. 39 
 
But there are even stronger treaty – hence legally binding – commitments. Member 
states are called upon to: 
 
                                                           
37   This differentiation was brought up when the discrepancies between the policies of 
member states were all too obvious and there was a feeling that it would be good to lower 
the targets. 
38   Art. 24(2) TEU, op.cit. 
39   Ibid., Art. 24(3). 
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consult one another within the European Council and the Council on any 
matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to determine 
a common approach.40  
 
Moreover: 
 
Before undertaking any action on the international scene or entering into any 
commitment which could affect the Union’s interests, each Member State 
shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council. Member 
States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is 
able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member 
States shall show mutual solidarity.41 
 
These are strong commitments. Most specifically, the Lisbon Treaty extended the 
authority of the High Representative to be responsible for the ‘preparation’ and 
‘implementation’ of the common foreign and security policy.42 And, of course, it is 
the High Representative’s primary task, to bring the member states together and to 
ensure solidarity. 
 
But if all of this were achieved, what type of foreign policy might this be? What are 
the principles and objectives that should guide EU foreign policy, the High 
Representative and EU diplomats? 
 
Besides providing a wide array of more specific objectives of EU foreign policy, Art. 
21 of the Treaty of Lisbon denotes that: 
 
The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles 
which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and 
which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and 
respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.43 
 
These are noble aims, but obviously EU foreign policy is guided not only by ideals but 
also by interests. The pursuit of both ideals and self-interest is the norm for foreign 
policy in democratic states. It would be foolish and hardly credible if the EU were to 
pretend that it does not pursue interests. The European Union is one of the world’s 
                                                           
40   Ibid., Art. 32.  
41   Ibid. 
42   Ibid., Art. 27. 
43   Ibid., Art. 21. 
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major economies. It is a major trader. It has close to 500 million citizens. EU foreign 
policy must inevitably keep the particular interests of its citizens in mind.44  
 
But it would be equally foolish to claim that the EU pursues particular short- and mid-
term interests only. The European Union has broader aims. In its Security Strategy of 
2003 it makes no bones about the intention to influence the world: “An active and 
capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it 
would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and 
more united world.”45 This was underlined in clear terms by former Commissioner for 
Development, Louis Michel: “Nous pouvons ensemble véritablement façonner un 
monde plus juste et plus équitable, et donc peser sur le destin du monde. Et parce 
que nous le pouvons, nous le devons.”46 
 
But ideals and long-term interests may converge. The Union must be interested in 
‘sculpting’ the world into a shape that ensures its survival and the maintenance of its 
basic values also in the long run.47 In fact, the EU is quite clear on this. As delineated 
in the European Security Strategy,48 it strives to achieve a more peaceful and stable 
world, a ‘rule-based international order’ in which conflicts are not resolved by force 
but by ‘effective multilateralism’, i.e. peaceful conflict resolution by negotiation and 
the use of institutions, specifically international organisations. Through ‘preventive 
engagement’ potential problems are to be spotted early and dealt with before they 
achieve crisis dimension. While it is recognised that the EU would be better off in a 
world of ‘well-governed democratic states’ it is not prerequisite that all states must 
be democracies. They only need to be sufficiently ‘well-governed’ so as to be stable 
and not to create disruptive problems. They must adhere to certain basic rules in 
                                                           
44   A good example for a combination of particular and other-regarding interest is the 
European Neighbourhood Policy; see Dieter Mahncke, “The Logic of EU Neighbourhood 
Policy”, in Dieter Mahncke and Sieglinde Gstöhl (eds.), Europe’s Near Abroad. Promises and 
Prospects of the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, College of Europe Studies 4, Brussels, PIE Peter 
Lang, 2008, pp. 19-46.  
45   European  Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Security 
Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003. This document was further embellished by the Report 
on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing 
World, approved by the European Council in Brussels on 11 December 2008. 
46   Quoted by David Spence, “EU Governance and Global Governance: New Roles for 
EU Diplomats”, in Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking and William Maley (eds.), Global 
Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 74. 
47   These thoughts are based on a previously published article by the author; see ch. 1 in 
Mahncke/Gstöhl, European Union Diplomacy, op.cit. 
48   European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World, op.cit. 
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their international relations and they need to be committed to peaceful resolution of 
conflict. Underlying it all is economic development: eradicating poverty and offering 
all peoples a fair perspective. 
 
Creating a ‘better world’ is an ideal, but it is also a long-term interest simply because 
the European Union and its members would be safer and better off in such a world. 
Moreover, the EU is particularly well-suited to make a bold attempt in this direction. 
First of all, it is itself a model of peaceful conflict resolution. The Union brings together 
27 states with different histories, traditions and memories and quite a few of them 
with a long history of hostile relations with each other. These member states have 
developed a system and a habit of peaceful conflict resolution between 
themselves,49 a fact easily taken for granted, but in reality a revolution in 
international affairs. Thus, the procedure, process and habit of peaceful conflict 
resolution comprise a key factor that Europeans can promote and contribute to 
international relations.  
 
A prerequisite to peaceful conflict resolution is the acceptance of compromise. This 
means that even when a party to a conflict is dissatisfied with the compromise, it will 
accept the result because acceptance and thus maintaining the overall system of 
peaceful conflict resolution offers more advantages than non-acceptance and the 
resulting conflict. Both peaceful conflict resolution and compromise thus require a 
critical degree of overall satisfaction with the status quo – in terms of status, 
prosperity, power and so forth – as well as certainty that there are fair procedures by 
which conditions may be changed. A system that does not allow for peaceful 
change cannot guarantee peace.50 
 
Whether it wants to or not, the European Union represents a model of compromise 
and peaceful conflict resolution. Such a model may indeed be an “export 
commodity”.51 Whatever other ideologies may offer, no other model succeeds as 
well in combining freedom with peace and prosperity. Wherever suppressed peoples 
                                                           
49    See the excellent and detailed study by Cross Davis, Mai’a K., The European 
Diplomatic Corps: Diplomats and International Cooperation from Westphalia to Maastricht, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.   
50   See on this Dieter Mahncke, “A New World Order?”, in August Reinisch and Ursula 
Kriebaum (eds.), The Law of International Relations, Liber Amicorum Hanspeter Neuhold, 
Utrecht, Eleven International Publishing, 2007, pp. 211-227. 
51   Spence, op.cit., p. 71. 
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rise – as in North Africa in 2011 – this is the model they proclaim to be seeking. For the 
European Union this means that its foreign policy must consistently show that it is not 
only pursuing ‘self-regarding’ European interests but is at the same time an active 
protagonist of ‘collective’ and ‘other-regarding’ interests. The relevant distinction 
here is between:  
 
the usually promoted and emphasized self-regarding interests (where the 
state in question is first and foremost the interested party), the less emphasized 
collective interests (where several states and actors enjoy advantages in 
common) and the usually ignored other-regarding interests (where the 
interests of other actors are dominant, but where the state in question can 
derive indirect benefit from the improved situation of other actors).52 
 
Since compromise is the life blood of the EU and EU foreign policy is young and in a 
sense a ‘new invention’, it is conceivable that the European Union would place 
enhanced emphasis on collective and other-regarding interests. This would be 
different from traditional ‘national interest’ diplomacy and could well be regarded 
as ‘post-modern’ diplomacy and a specific contribution of Europe – the ancient 
‘continent of wars’ – to modern international relations. The EU concept of 
‘conditionality’ and the European Neighbourhood Policy are examples of such an 
approach, whatever their shortcomings may be. 
 
For this, the EU claims to have a particularly wide array of foreign policy tools – from 
trade to cultural exchange, from development aid to crisis management – and is 
thus singularly well-suited to aim for and implement more fundamental – structural – 
foreign policy aims: “as a soft power, the EU ought to have the ability to use various 
policies in order to have a real impact on the global stage.”53 Indeed, the EU is well 
equipped to combine development and security, trade and climate change or any 
other combination of issues and to place them in an overall EU foreign policy 
framework that combines the concepts of preventive engagement and effective 
multilateralism with the appropriate policies and tools.  
 
                                                           
52   Quoted from Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of 
the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2008, p. 21. Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan base their argument on Alexander L. George and Robert O. Keohane, “The 
Concept of National Interests: Uses and Limitations”, in Alexander L. George (ed.), Presidential 
Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy, Boulder, Westview Press, pp. 217-238. 
53   Verhofstadt interview by Weiss, op.cit., p. 5. 
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But who is to do this? Can the High Representative, confronted by jealous institutions 
and wary member states, with a carefully circumscribed mandate and little stature, 
be expected to develop the required initiative and vision? The issue thus remains the 
same as before: Is there a will to create t h a t  ‘ s i n g l e  E u r o p e a n  v o i c e ’  o n  t h e  
international stage that can provide vision and weight or will the EEAS remain an 
agency to implement mainly technical and limited objectives?  
 
Conclusions 
 
For the future three issues stand out as in need of further analysis. First, there must be 
more concentration on EU foreign policy outcomes rather than policy-making 
processes. Analysts – both academics and politicians – have tended to concentrate 
on institutions and procedures. Thus, for example, there are numerous studies on the 
making and particularly the objectives of CSDP activities but few on the results.54 
However, it is time to ‘normalise’ the study of EU foreign policy and to move away 
from the inward- to a more outward-looking approach. Foreign policy analysis 
normally concentrates on results – and moves back from there to assess the 
appropriateness of the means and measures. Domestic decision-making processes 
are usually a specialised sub-topic. While entirely understandable that the EU has 
focussed much effort on this, it is time to move on. Assessing results will have three 
beneficial effects. It will show what the ambitions of the EU are, what results the EU is 
actually achieving, and, last but not least, what the Union needs to do if it wants to 
make a difference. 
 
S e c o n d ,  t h i s  w i l l  l e a d  t o  a  c l o s e r  l o o k  a t  t h e  b a s i c s  o f  E U  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  a n d  
particularly the role of the High Representative and the External Action Service. If EU 
foreign policy ambitions or needs stand out but policies, such as there are, show 
meagre results, the reasons for this will need to be analysed. They will become 
apparent fairly quickly and highlight, on the one hand, the underlying lack of 
political unity and, on the other, the limited competence and effectiveness of the 
instruments that exist. It will be up to the Europeans to draw conclusions from this and 
to undertake appropriate measures. It is of little use to continue the current practice 
                                                           
54    A notable exception is Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (eds.), Die EU als 
strategischer Akteur in der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik? Eine systematische 
Bestandsaufnahme von ESVP-Missionen und -operationen, Berlin, SWP Studie S 32, December 
2009. 
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of pointing to institutional improvements and lauding highflying objectives but 
ignoring results. 
 
Third, it will be necessary for the Union to define more precisely (than in the Lisbon 
Treaty or in the European Security Strategy) what its foreign policy objectives are and 
what concrete policy implications they have. This would make the differences and 
the interplay between self-regarding, collective and other-regarding interests 
clearer, both for the Union and for third parties. 
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